More than a year after his inauguration, US President Donald Trump continues to spark intense debates between Chinese scholars
More than a year after his inauguration, US President Donald Trump continues to engage in unconventional behaviour, not least in his style of administration. His personality and his actions have sparked intense debates between Chinese scholars. Many of them depict him as a fickle narcissist, a fierce negotiator, and a skilled strategist – while also seeing his China policy as rooted in long-term trends within, and the internal dynamics of, the Republican Party.
A fickle narcissist and a master strategist
Inspired by US journalists and academics, Chinese scholars such as Wang Yiming, Shi Yinhong, and Yin Jiwu use political psychology to analyse Trump’s behaviour and personality. According to Wang, a postdoctoral student, and Shi, a professor at Renmin University’s School of International Relations, Trump exhibits a “typical narcissist personality” (统典型的自恋型人格 tong dianxin de zi lian xing renge), reflected in his “exaggeration of self-value, lack of public sentiment, and desire to perform on stage, showing paranoia, anger, repetition, suspicion, (and) hatred”.1 They argue that narcissism was Trump’s main motivation for participating in the presidential campaign, and has profoundly shaped his political philosophy and policy preferences, permeating every political decision in the US governance process.
Similarly, Yin, a professor at Beijing Foreign Studies University’s School of International Studies, and his co-authors – Zheng Jianjun, an associate researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences’ Institute of Political Science, and Li Hongzhou, a graduate researcher at Beijing Foreign Studies University’s School of International Relations – characterise Trump as “uninhibited and fickle” (不羁善变 buji shanbian), “keen-witted and capable” (精干有为 jinggan youwei), “eager to pursue profit for himself” (逐利自我 jianli ziwo), “eager to outshine others” (好胜 haosheng), “persistent” (执着 zhizhuo), and “energetic and extrovert” (积极外向 jiji waixiang).2 Above all, in these scholars’ view, his strong ego, self-confidence, and willingness to break with political and social norms make him a powerful leader, whose personality foreign scholars must analyse to understand his policy.
Other Chinese scholars believe that Trump’s seemingly incoherent actions stem from a deliberate strategy rather than ignorance of political issues. On this point, they tend to dismiss the US media’s largely negative coverage of the president. According to Shen Yi, an associate professor at Fudan University’s Department of International Politics, this negative coverage is the result of an appetite for emotive, sensationalist reporting.3 He argues that, to properly understand both US politics and Trump’s personality, scholars should ignore the American media’s “obsession” with scandals involving Trump, such as that around Russian meddling in the 2016 US presidential elections.
Likewise, Wang Dong, an associate professor at Peking University’s School of International Studies, is wary of Western mainstream reporting and sensationalist books such as Michael Wolff’s Fire and Fury.4 This kind of reporting, Wang Dong argues, harbours a deep prejudice against the president and underestimates his good qualities. He adds that Trump is far from being ignorant, explaining that, on the contrary, Trump’s aggressive and inconsistent moves give him the upper hand in negotiations. Wang Dong contends that, “objectively speaking, Trump has some very good qualities, such as his determination, courage, and strength,” and that the president “did a very good job this year” on economic policy.5
Yin and his co-authors also emphasise Trump’s qualities as a strategist and a negotiator. His ability to hide his intentions and manipulate his opponents’ emotions makes him a skilled negotiator, they argue. They believe that Trump’s upbringing and his education at New York Military Academy have made him a strong, wilful, and efficient leader – a master strategist. His keen sense for the domestic and international political scene allows him to seize opportunities and adapt to changes.
Most Chinese academics contend that, beyond the apparently incoherent rhetoric, Trump’s core objectives are rational and consistent. Yin and his co-authors contend that Trump’s strategy serves his fundamental goal – promoting US national interests – and believe that Trump will not significantly change his approach.
Of course, Trump has changed political sides several times, in line with his business interests. He supported Democratic candidates before 1987 and during 2001-2009, but Republican candidates at other times. This is due to his lack of interest in political ideologies, Yin and his co-authors say. They argue that Trump’s background as a successful businessman has shaped his vision of America’s interests as based on the economics of profit and loss rather than politics. They state that Trump believes in trade and reciprocal relations – as is common among businesspeople.
Long-term trends in America’s China policy
Some Chinese analysts point to key decisions as evidence that Trump’s policy is rooted in long-term trends within, and the internal dynamics of, the Republican Party. These include the decision to withdraw the United States from the 21st Conference of the Parties Agreement on climate change and the decision to undermine the Affordable Care Act, which his predecessor, Barack Obama, established. Trump’s policy on China also aligns with the position of the Republican Party, some analysts argue.
As Wang Dong sees it, “in terms of grand strategic direction, Trump and Obama are essentially on the same line of strategic retreat.” Wang notes that, just as Obama tried to limit US military engagements abroad, Trump’s rhetoric – throughout his election campaign and his time in office – has focused on promoting “US priorities” rather than strengthening America’s role as the world’s policeman.
Similarly, Da Wei, director of the Chinese Modern International Relations Institute’s American Research Institute, states that Trump’s hardline attitude towards China is not so much an innovation of his own as a reflection of viewpoints of the American public and strategic community.6 Ultimately, he explains, US policy on China is rooted in the countries’ contrasting positions in the world. Da contends that the US policy of engagement with China that prevailed in the 1970s and 1980s was based on an asymmetrical relationship between a strong America and a weak China, particularly the idea that it would be possible to influence China to ultimately accept the US concepts of democracy and capitalism. This was an era in which the US believed in the inevitable success of American-style democracy and what Francis Fukuyama famously called the “end of history”. But history has proven these predictions wrong: China has risen but has not become liberal. Thus, Da concludes, a hardline faction started to emerge within the American establishment under the presidencies of George W. Bush and Obama, leading to a consensus on the need to contain China.
Nonetheless, Da points out several major splits within the American establishment. Firstly, while Obama has made use of the international alliance system to contain China’s rise, Trump conducts his policy within an “America first” framework and in defiance of his allies. Like Yin, Da believes that Trump’s foreign policy is less ideological and more transactional than Obama’s, and that “reciprocity” seems to have become the main goal of the Trump administration’s strategy on China.
Secondly, Da argues that the divergence between isolationists and internationalists in the Trump administration has created major uncertainties that will determine this strategy in the short and medium term. Internationalists themselves are divided into military hawks who emphasise security issues and members of the so-called “Goldman gang” – named for its inclusion of former Goldman Sachs employees – who focus on opening the Chinese market.
Da concludes that Trump’s policy on China could take one of four possible forms: cooperation in the context of US isolationism; confrontation in the context of US isolationism; cooperation in an international context; and confrontation in an international context. Da contends that the form it ultimately takes will depend not only on Trump’s personality but also power dynamics within the White House.
Most Chinese analysts expect Trump’s tough stance on China to last, but also note the potential for fruitful cooperation between Beijing and Washington. As Da points out, there are already significant differences between Trump’s approach to China during his election campaign and his current, more moderate stance. In response, he and other Chinese analysts argue, China should adopt a firm but reassuring position, and should play a stabilising role in international politics.
1: 王一鸣、时殷弘: “特朗普行为的根源：自恋人格特质与对外政策偏好”, 澎湃新闻, 24 March 2018 (Wang Yiming and Shi Yinhong, “The roots of Trump’s behaviour: Narcissist personality and foreign policy preferences”, The Paper, 24 March 2018).
2: 尹继武，郑建君，李宏洲: “特朗普的政治人格特质及其政策偏好分析”, 现代国际关系, 2017, 2 (Yin Jiwu, Zheng Jianjun, Li Hongzhou, “Analysis of Trump’s political personality traits and policy preferences”, Modern International Relations, no. 2, 2017).
3: 沈逸：“‘火与怒’热销折射反特朗普阵营的窘境”, 观察者, 2018-01-06 (Shen Yi, “‘Fire and Fury’, a best-seller reflects the dilemmas of the anti-Trump camp”, Observer, 6 January 2018).
4: 王栋, “执政一年了，特朗普是什么人该看清楚了吧”, 侠客岛, 2018-01-20 (Wang Dong, “After a year in office, we should see clearly what sort of man Trump is”, Xiake Island, 20 January 2018 – hereafter, Dong, “After a year in office, we should see clearly what sort of man Trump is”).
5: 达巍, “美国对华战略逻辑的演进与’特朗普冲击’”, 世界经济与政治, 2017, 5 ( Da Wei, “The Evolution of US Strategic Logic towards China, and the ‘Trump Shock’”, International Economy and Politics, no. 5, 2017).
This article was first written for the China Analytica, which is the copyright holder.