Repression in Xinjiang has reached new extremes and there are signs that hostility to Islam may be spreading elsewhere
This year has seen unusual parades involving thousands of heavily armed troops in three of Xinjiang’s most important cities: Kashgar, Hotan and the capital, Urumqi. This show of force came after new regulations and measures that have effectively transformed the province into a surveillance state.
What next
The traditional ‘double-fisted’ approach that combines repression with economic incentives has shown its limits, as violent attacks in Xinjiang have generally increased since the major riots of 2009. More vigorous repression may prevent attacks in the short term but is expensive and will fuel resentment that could make it more difficult to relax repressive policies again in the future. However, the current approach is backed by the central government and will most likely prevail.
Subsidiary Impacts
- Recent events indicate a transformation from a nationalist fight into a religious one, in line with similar developments worldwide.
- The allegiance of most militants in Xinjiang still goes to the Turkestan Islamic Party, despite Islamic State (IS) successes.
- Elsewhere in China, Islam is increasingly considered a threat by both the Chinese authorities and the public opinion.
Analysis
Militarisation is not new in Xinjiang: since riots in Urumqi in 2009, the authorities have increased the role of the People’s Liberation Army and People’s Armed Police, turning the province into a quasi military state.
However, this year’s demonstrations of military power are unprecedented and disproportionate to the current situation. Despite recent incidents – a car attack in Karakax county killing five people in December 2016 and a knife attack in southwestern Xinjiang killing eight people in February 2017 – ethnic violence overall has declined markedly as repression intensified after a particularly violent year in 2014.
An intensification of a decades-long approach to Uighur opposition, this year’s new show of force bears the mark of Xinjiang’s new Communist Party chief, Chen Quanguo. Chen’s transfer to Xinjiang in August 2016 was seen as an implicit endorsement of the hard-line management of ethnic issues he adopted when governing Tibet from 2011 to 2016. He now has a clear mandate to bring Xinjiang to heel and wants to make his mark ahead of the Party Congress later this year in which he could gain a seat on the Politburo.
Grassroots surveillance
Since his transfer to Xinjiang, Chen has launched a heavy crackdown on religious activities and created a mass surveillance system, while promoting economic development through increased investment in infrastructure and tax relief for companies.
The ‘carrot and stick’ strategy remains in place, though with greater emphasis now on the repressive side
Since a local counterterrorism law was passed in August 2016, the definition of ‘terrorism’ has expanded to cover a wide range of Muslim religious activities, stipulating that it is illegal to intervene in others' marriages, funerals and inheritance issues for religious reasons, as well as to spread ‘distorted’ Islamic ideas. Regulations that took effect on April 7 this year further forbid long beards, the wearing of veils in public places and the use of religious instead of legal procedures to marry or divorce.
To implement the new restrictions, Chen’s administration has set up ‘convenience police stations’ throughout the province. Officially, these stations offer services to communities such as mobile phone charging stations, Wi-Fi, umbrellas, wheelchairs, hot tea and free newspapers.
In fact, they are mainly used to gather information on residents' behaviour, creating a system of grassroots mass surveillance. About 950 such stations will be set up in Urumqi alone, and 30,000 officers have been hired to staff them province-wide.
High-tech control
High-tech tools have also been deployed under Chen’s administration. Local measures in Uighur areas include:
- bio-data samples for residents applying for passports;
- a sweeping extension of video surveillance in urban areas;
- password-activated security doors and ‘panic buttons’ in shops;
- a ban on chat applications such as Telegram and WhatsApp;
- the obligation to install GPS trackers in vehicles; and
- a ban on private networks (VPNs).
Spending on security in the region jumped 20% in 2016 to more than 30 billion renminbi (4.35 billion dollars). Maintaining peace in Xinjiang is seen as essential to President Xi Jinping’s ‘One Belt One Road’ initiative, especially ahead of the summit currently underway in Beijing.
However, there is a trade-off: security measures that constrain communication and trade could hamper economic development and jeopardise the policy’s overall success.
TIP versus IS
The One Belt One Road initiative is further threatened by new regional challenges arising from the fragmentation of militant Islamist movements in the Middle East. Just as Chinese troops marched in Urumqi on February 28, a video released by members of IS hinted at growing tensions between the newer IS and the long-established, al-Qaeda-linked Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP, formerly known as East Turkestan Islamic Movement, ETIM).
However, despite recent successes in the Middle East, IS remains a much less serious threat to China than the Pakistan Taliban-linked TIP. The TIP has greater propaganda outreach among the Uighur population in Xinjiang and is much stronger in terms of operational capability, recruitment and manpower. It reportedly has more than 1,000 Uighur fighters in Iraq and Syria, while only 114 have reportedly joined IS.
Even though the TIP has claimed some attacks in China, including a 2013 attack in Tiananmen Square, its main battlefield is Syria and Iraq; most attacks in Xinjiang are probably local and independent and claimed by the group retrospectively.
In this context, it is unlikely that the video will prompt China to reconsider its hands-off policies towards the Middle East. However, it could have important consequences for domestic policy. Hours after the release of the video, Xi called for a “great wall of iron” in Xinjiang, a declaration that will likely trigger an escalation in the security crackdown.
Targeting Islam
More broadly, a worldwide focus on Islamist terrorism is affecting China, where established traditions of religious tolerance (outside of Xinjiang and Tibet) are being challenged.
In contrast to the strict regulations enforced in Xinjiang, most Muslims minorities in China still enjoy a relatively large degree of religious freedom. However, echoing the anti-Islam narrative in Western countries, there are signs that China’s population may be coming to view Islam as a source of problems.
Draft changes of a low-level administrative regulation in mid-January, stipulating that anyone publishing “contents in publications or online platforms that contain insults or prejudice against a religion or ethnicity” will be subject to administrative detainment from 10 to 15 days stirred a controversy online, with netizens accusing the government of excessive leniency towards Islam.
China’s leaders themselves have hardened their rhetoric, encouraged by Xi’s effort to tighten the Party’s supervision of religious life, while acknowledging its existence. Christians have also been targeted in a crackdown on unauthorised congregations and an aggressive campaign to limit the visibility of churches.
Officials from Ningxia, a region usually lauded for its religious harmony, warned in May 2017 against the spectre of Islamist extremism, saying extremism was “infiltrating China’s inland provincial areas” and spreading out of Xinjiang. In the current global context, it is possible that the crackdown on religious practices in Xinjiang will extend to Muslims elsewhere in the country in the near future.
This article was first written for the Oxford Analytica Daily Brief, which is the copyright holder.